Phase 01 · Authorization & scope
Scope & Rules of Engagement
Nothing in a legitimate assessment starts before this document is agreed and signed. The rules of engagement below are synthetic and illustrative, but they follow the structure a real engagement requires: what may be touched, what may never be touched, how evidence is handled, and when testing stops.
Engagement metadata
Synthetic engagement record for the portfolio lab.
- Assessment name
- Project Nightwatch
- Client
- Synthetic Mid-Market SaaS Organization
- Engagement type
- External + web application + identity review
- Testing window
- Illustrative only — no real testing window exists
- Methodology basis
- OWASP WSTG concepts, NIST CSF 2.0 functions, and attack-path reasoning
- Report version
- v1.0 (portfolio demonstration)
Authorization statement
Written authorization from the asset owner is required before any real testing activity begins. That authorization must name the in-scope assets, the testing window, the approved techniques, the emergency contacts, and the stop conditions. No assessment activity in this lab was performed against any real system: the engagement described here does not exist, and the authorization statement is presented to demonstrate the control, not to imply one was granted.
Scope boundaries
Authorized assets are explicit; anything not listed is out of scope by default.
Authorized assets (synthetic)
- portal.lab.invalid — synthetic customer portal (WEB-01)
- api.lab.invalid — synthetic public API gateway (API-01)
- id.lab.invalid — synthetic identity service (IAM-01)
- 198.51.100.0/24 — documentation range representing the lab perimeter
- 10.20.0.0/16 — synthetic internal lab range (authenticated review only)
Explicitly excluded
- Any real production system, domain, or IP address
- Third-party SaaS, payment processors, and hosting provider control planes
- Employee endpoints, personal accounts, and physical facilities
- Any asset not explicitly listed in the authorized scope table
Techniques and prohibitions
Stated at a high level. Techniques are described, never operationalized.
Allowed techniques
- Passive attack-surface inventory of synthetic lab assets
- Authenticated and unauthenticated review of lab application workflows
- Configuration and access-control review against documented expectations
- Non-destructive validation sufficient to confirm a finding exists
- Attack-path modelling and trust-boundary analysis on paper
Prohibited actions
- Denial-of-service or availability-degrading testing
- Destructive testing, data deletion, or modification of records
- Persistence, implants, backdoors, or malware of any kind
- Real credential harvesting, phishing of real people, or social engineering
- Targeting third parties, shared infrastructure, or out-of-scope assets
- Exfiltration of data beyond the minimum needed to evidence a finding
Evidence, stop conditions, and escalation
Evidence handling
- Evidence is described in narrative form; no live payloads are published.
- Synthetic screenshots and logs are redacted by default.
- Evidence is stored in an access-controlled engagement workspace.
- Evidence is retained only for the reporting and retest period, then destroyed.
Stop conditions
- Indication that an out-of-scope or third-party system is affected
- Discovery of apparent real personal data in a lab environment
- Unexpected service instability or availability impact
- Evidence of a pre-existing compromise
Escalation path
- Tester pauses activity and records the time and last action taken.
- Immediate notification to the engagement lead and client security contact.
- Joint decision recorded in writing before any activity resumes.